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1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
he U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s 
(HUD) Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing 
Demonstration, or MTO, is a large, federally funded social 
experiment designed to test whether improved neighborhood 
opportunities may significantly affect the life chances of low-
income public housing residents. This paper provides the first 
systematic overview of the design of the MTO and describes its 
key features. The paper also offers the first cross-site analysis of 
research findings and explores the MTO’s relevance to social 
science research concerning housing and neighborhood effects. 
We begin with the social science background to MTO and 
discuss the purposes of the demonstration. We then describe 
the key features of the demonstration and how its experimental 
design addresses methodological issues that have long limited 
neighborhood effects research. The implementation of the 
demonstration and how that implementation shapes and 
limits the research is discussed next, followed by a description 
of the major research results from a number of MTO studies. 
We conclude with a discussion of future research needs and 
policy issues.
1.1 Research Background
Research over the last decade has shown that poverty in the 
United States has become increasingly concentrated in “high-
poverty” neighborhoods, and that such concentrations appear 
to have a range of detrimental effects on the well-being and 
future opportunities of residents of those areas (Jargowsky 
1997; Wilson 1987, 1996; Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, Klebanov, 
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and Saland 1993; Aneshensel and Sucoff 1996; Sampson 2000; 
Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001; Catsambis and 
Beveridge 2001). The harmful effects of high-poverty areas are 
thought to be especially severe for children; their behavior, 
choices, and prospects may be particularly susceptible to 
neighborhood-based events and characteristics, such as peer 
group influence, school quality, and the level of violent crime 
(Galster and Killen 1995; Ellen and Turner 1997; Leventhal and 
Brooks-Gunn 2001). 
Social scientists have also focused recently on the possible 
theoretical causes of both the positive and negative effects of 
neighborhoods (Manski 1993, 2000; Galster and Killen 1995; 
Galster, Quercia, and Cortes 2000; Leventhal and Brooks-
Gunn forthcoming). The core question is whether there are 
clear, independent effects from a neighborhood. If so, then 
social science must next attempt to identify the causes and 
processes through which such effects appear in the lives of 
children, adolescents, or adults. While there has long been 
social science evidence of the harmful effects of living in 
concentrated-poverty neighborhoods, evidence and discussion 
about how neighborhood environments may exert positive 
influences on behavior and life chances are more recent 
(Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, and Aber 1997; Sampson, Morenoff, 
and Gannon-Rowley 2002). 
Galster and Killen (1995) have noted the complexity of the 
causal influences linking metropolitan and neighborhood-
based opportunities; they point out the dynamic nature of 
opportunities, and the critical issue of residents’ willingness 
and ability to take advantage of contextually positioned 
resources. Ellen and Turner’s (1997) summary of the literature 
in this area suggests various mechanisms by which middle-class 
(often predominantly white) neighborhoods shape, or reshape, 
the lives of residents. The effects of neighborhood appear to 
be more pronounced for children rather than for adults. 
Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn (2001) offer evidence that 
neighborhood influences on achievement measures—such 
as IQ—are most important below five years of age. 
Despite considerable progress over the last decade, 
researchers have only a limited understanding of which 
neighborhood effects are most likely to appear first, in what 
types of households or family members they may appear, under 
what circumstances, and with what durability or persistence. 
This paper provides evidence that there are such effects, that 
they are clearest for children and teenagers, and that there is  
little evidence of positive neighborhood effects on adults to 
date. 
We also do not know whether there are effective policy tools 
for improving the life chances of those who move into better-
off neighborhoods. Among the research issues that have 
received minimal attention is whether public housing or other 
forms of federal housing assistance for the poor can alter the 
present or future opportunities of program participants 
(Newman and Harkness 2002). Interest is relatively recent 
concerning whether moving families from heavily racially and 
poverty-concentrated neighborhoods can generate positive 
changes in attitudes and subsequent behavior (Rubinowitz and 
Rosenbaum 2000; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development 2000; Goetz 2001). And there has been a notable 
absence of experimentally designed research to address 
persistent policy and research questions about the positive or 
negative effects of concentrations of assisted housing (Galster 
and Daniell 1996).
Following the Experimental Housing Allowance Program 
begun in 1970, MTO was the first attempt to design and 
operate a random-assignment program aimed at testing the 
effects of HUD’s major current forms of housing assistance—
public housing and tenant-based Section 8 rental assistance—
compared with an economically based, deconcentrated form of 
rental assistance (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development 2000). Specifically, MTO is the first systematic 
test of whether shifting to tenant-based assistance and altering 
the neighborhood may noticeably improve the life chances of 
low-income residents who formerly lived in distressed, inner-
city public-housing developments.
The first research suggestion that housing mobility or 
deconcentration may have important social and educational 
effects appeared in the late 1980s, prompted by a federal court-
ordered racial desegregation program in Chicago. Under the 
name of tenant-activist Dorothy Gautreaux, applicants and 
residents of Chicago public housing brought a class-action 
housing segregation lawsuit against HUD and the Chicago 
Housing Authority (CHA) in 1966 (Davis 1993; Rubinowitz 
and Rosenbaum 2000). After years of litigation, which went all 
the way to the Supreme Court, the courts ordered HUD and 
the local CHA to remedy the extreme racial segregation that 
they had imposed on public-housing applicants and residents. 
Starting in the late 1970s, these agencies had to provide (among 
other remedies) a housing mobility option throughout the 
Chicago region for about 7,100 black families.
The Gautreaux program took shape as a result of the Court’s 
ruling. “Gautreaux families,” as they became known, were 
helped to move out of racially isolated areas through the (then-
new) tenant-based Section 8 program. Families chosen for the 
Gautreaux program received Section 8 certificates that 
required them to move to either predominantly white or 
racially mixed neighborhoods. They also received assistance 
from housing counselors to make these moves. Roughly three-
quarters of all the families were required to move to 
predominantly white (usually suburban) areas, while about 
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neighborhoods. Families unwilling to make these moves did 
not receive the housing subsidy. While the eligibility criteria, as 
well as the forms of housing counseling offered participants, 
varied somewhat over the roughly twenty years of the 
program’s operation, the required move to a nonsegregated 
neighborhood persisted until the completion of the program in 
1998 (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000).
Beginning in the late 1980s, research on the Gautreaux 
program suggested that the moves to less segregated suburban 
locations were associated with measurable improvements in 
the lives of participating children. Changes were reported for 
small samples of children who had been living in less segregated 
neighborhoods for periods of seven to ten years. Such children 
were less likely to drop out of school and were more likely to 
take college-track classes than their peers (in a comparison 
group) who moved within the City of Chicago rather than to 
suburban areas. The city neighborhoods were poorer and more 
racially segregated than the suburban locations. After 
graduating from high school, the Gautreaux children were also 
more likely than their city peers to attend a four-year college or 
to become employed full-time (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 
2000). 
1.2 MTO’s Purpose
The promising Gautreaux results, as well as increasing concern 
about the high levels of racial and economic isolation of many 
public housing families (Hirsch 1983; Newman and Schnare 
1997), led Congress to initiate a demonstration program aimed 
at offering better neighborhood opportunities to public-
housing residents living in distressed inner-city areas. Dimond 
(2000, p. 259) outlines the antipoverty argument for MTO: 
Isolating poor persons in inner-city ghettos and barrios 
does not help them connect to the rising demand for 
more workers throughout the local regional labor 
markets. . . . Thus federal, state, and local governments act 
irresponsibly and waste taxpayer dollars whenever they 
limit housing and job-training subsidies to particular 
projects or places—public or private—rather than putting 
such subsidies directly in the hands of poor families so 
they can choose for themselves where best to live and 
learn in order to find new and better jobs.
In 1992, these factors—the concentration and persistence 
of urban poverty and the awareness of the Gautreaux 
program findings—led a coalition of Democratic and 
Republican policymakers to propose offering public-housing 
residents the chance to move to private rental housing in 
more affluent communities by means of a housing voucher. 
The demonstration they envisioned would test whether 
HUD’s main tenant-based housing program, the Section 8 
rental assistance program, could be used effectively to assist 
poor, largely minority families in successful relocation to 
private rental housing in working-class or middle-class 
neighborhoods—in which landlords were unaccustomed to 
renting to poor families.
MTO is a planned social experiment making use of HUD’s 
Section 8 rental subsidy program to facilitate the residential 
mobility of families out of inner-city public-housing 
developments in five cities across the country. The MTO 
demonstration was authorized by the Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1992 to “assist very low-
income families with children who reside in public housing or 
housing receiving project-based assistance under Section 8 of 
the Housing and Community Development Act of 1937 to 
move out of areas with high concentrations of persons living in 
poverty to areas with low concentrations of such persons.” 
High concentrations of poverty were defined as census tracts 
where 40 percent or more of the residents were poor in 1990. 
Low-poverty areas were defined as census tracts where less 
than 10 percent of the population lived in poverty in 1990. 
The 40 percent threshold follows a social science standard for 
defining deeply poor (“underclass”) neighborhoods (Jargowsky 
1997; Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, and Leventhal 1997). The
10 percent threshold for “low poverty” corresponds to the 
median tract-level poverty rate across the United States in 1990.
Congress appropriated $20 million in Section 8 rental 
assistance for fiscal year 1992 and another $50 million for fiscal 
year 1993 for MTO. Congress also stipulated that HUD should 
conduct evaluations of the demonstration to determine short- 
and long-term impacts. HUD decided that the most effective 
means for reliably answering questions about such impacts was 
to establish a social experiment, including a random- 
assignment process that would allocate, by a computerized 





The problem of selection bias has been recognized by social 
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Gautreaux research and most other research on neighborhood 
effects (Mayer and Jencks 1989; Crane 1991; Case and Katz 
1991; Lehman and Smeeding 1997, p. 262). Jencks and Mayer 
(1990, p. 119) caution:
The most fundamental problem confronting anyone 
who wants to estimate neighborhood’s effects on 
children is distinguishing between neighborhood effects 
and family effects. This means that children who grow 
up in rich neighborhoods would differ to some extent 
from children who grow up in poor neighborhoods even 
if neighborhoods had no effect whatever.
People typically select their neighborhoods to match their 
needs and resources. Therefore, researchers restricted to cross-
sectional, nonexperimental evidence must try to separate the 
impact of personal factors affecting choice of neighborhood 
from the effects of the neighborhood. But it is difficult—if not 
impossible—to measure all these socioeconomic, personal, and 
local characteristics well enough to distinguish their effects. 
The answers sought are often hidden in unmeasured factors 
and unexplained variations.
Issues of selection bias notably limited the credibility of the 
findings from the Gautreaux research. First, there was evidence 
that families self-selected to participate in the program. There 
was also evidence that the program screened participants for 
suitability to particular neighborhoods or communities. In the 
early years of Gautreaux, for example, program managers and 
counselors identified the families with the potential to succeed 
in the suburbs, and matched them with landlords and 
communities there. Other families, judged to be less suitable 
for suburban locations, were not placed by the program or were 
placed in city neighborhoods. Second, because of the limited 
information gathered and kept about the families who joined 
Gautreaux but did not move, the differences in families’ 
demographic or personal characteristics that affected success in 
moving could not be investigated. Third, some evidence of 
positive mobility effects in the Gautreaux program is based 
upon small, nonrepresentative fractions of the families 
enrolled—those who could be found a number of years later 
(Popkin, Buron, Levy, and Cunningham 2000).
The direct solution to the problem of selectivity bias is to 
remove people’s ability to select their neighborhoods by 
randomly assigning them to a community. This detaches the 
individual’s personal characteristics and preferences from the 
neighborhoods’ potential impacts (Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, 
Leventhal, and Aber 1997, p. 286). Jencks and Mayer (1990, 
p. 119) describe this requirement: 
From a scientific perspective, the best way to estimate 
neighborhood effects would be to conduct controlled 
experiments in which we assigned families randomly to 
different neighborhoods, persuaded each family to remain 
in its assigned neighborhood for a protracted period, and 
then measured each neighborhood’s effects on the 
children involved.
However, until MTO, there had never been an initiative to 
design and implement this type of controlled experiment.
2.2 MTO’s Experimental Design
From September 1994 to July 1998, public- and assisted-
housing families, who volunteered and were found to be 
eligible, were randomly assigned to one of three groups:
1. The MTO treatment group, which received Section 8 
certificates or vouchers usable only in areas of less than 
10 percent poverty. Families in this group were also 
provided counseling assistance from a local nonprofit 
organization in finding a private rental unit.
2. A Section 8 comparison group, which received regular 
Section 8 certificates or vouchers with no special 
geographic restrictions or counseling.
3. An in-place control group, which continued to receive its 
current project-based assistance.
The Section 8 comparison group was established in order to 
allow measurement of the extent to which the routine 
operation of the Section 8 program generates changes in 
location and in family outcomes that can be compared with 
changes for the treatment-group population. The in-place 
control group was created to measure the behavioral outcomes 
for children and adults who remained in public-housing 
developments in deeply poor communities to permit 
comparison of their outcomes with the other two groups. 
Although MTO was targeted to a specific population (very low-
income families with children, living in public or assisted 
housing in concentrated-poverty areas), its participants share 
many characteristics with families who have worst-case 
housing needs, families excluded from the economic 
mainstream, and families in poverty (U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development 2001).
The random-assignment design embedded in the MTO 
demonstration program seeks to test the effects of 
neighborhood experimentally and avoid selection bias. MTO 
uses a carefully designed and strictly implemented random-
assignment process to ensure that nothing about an individual 
or family could influence the group assignment. Assignment of 
families among the three groups was carried out under uniform 
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recordkeeping. As a result, the research findings concerning 
MTO address whether willing poor families with children—
given the opportunity to improve their neighborhood 
conditions—may benefit significantly from an atypical change 
in residential location. 
The experimental design of MTO not only permits analyses 
of impacts in a variety of domains (such as child educational 
achievement, adult employment and earnings, youth risk-
taking, and the physical and mental health of family members) 
but also permits multiple-method or tiered assessments of 
cross-cutting questions that will help verify or enhance what 
has been learned about neighborhood impacts on families, 
adults, and children. Answering these questions is possible 
because MTO is an ongoing, longitudinal research project 
designed to address some questions that only the passage of 
time can answer.
2.3 MTO’s Research Hypothesis
MTO’s design includes three phases of evaluation. The first 
phase, conducted by seven teams of social scientists operating 
in single MTO sites and with their own research strategies, 
constitutes the bulk of the evidence synthesized in this paper. 
The second stage is a major cross-site evaluation, currently in 
the field, from which results are expected by 2003. The third 
and final stage of MTO research will occur approximately
six years from now—a final impact evaluation of the 
demonstration.
MTO’s research value is rooted in the fact that it is the first 
experimentally designed panel study aimed at understanding 
the effects that neighborhoods may have upon low-income 
residents of public and assisted housing. The experiment has 
been designed to show whether the negative impacts of 
distressed neighborhoods on families can be reversed by 
offering public-housing families the choice to volunteer to 
move to more affluent neighborhoods. The core hypothesis is 
that MTO will have positive and statistically significant effects 
on the lives of the experimental-group families when compared 
with the lives of the in-place control-group members. 
Contrasts with any effects experienced by the Section 8 
comparison group will reveal whether tenant-based rental 
assistance—without any geographical restriction—can achieve 
similar results. The MTO hypothesis is that the offer of a move 
from a poor to a nonpoor neighborhood will significantly 
improve the neighborhood conditions of the families, and will 
affect their longer run prospects in areas such as education, 
health, risky behavior, and criminal activity.
MTO provides an estimate of the effectiveness of the offer of 
the experimental treatment in improving the lives of public-
housing residents as a group. The intent-to-treat (ITT) 
estimates reported in this paper recognize that some members 
of the target group did not use the Section 8 subsidy. The 
measured ITT effects include the outcomes not only for those 
who moved, but also for those who were randomly assigned to 
receive the treatment but did not relocate. However, even if the 
ITT effects are statistically significant, the larger the proportion 
of those who fail to move then the less effective a program like 
MTO would be in improving the lives of additional public- 
housing families. 
Next, we describe the results of the implementation stage of 
the demonstration and discuss the characteristics of the MTO 
volunteers. We then present the research results on the effects 
of the experiment on the children, teenagers, and adults who 
participated, focusing essentially on ITT effects.
3. MTO Implementation—
Characteristics and Limitations
In this section, we turn to the specifics of how the MTO 
demonstration was conducted. These details provide 
information on demonstration selection criteria and on some 
of the characteristics of the programs design that affect the 
interpretation of the research findings reported in the next 
section.
3.1 Initial Implementation
MTO implementation began with HUD’s issuance of a notice 
of funding availability (NOFA) in September 1993 soliciting 
sites for the demonstration. The NOFA laid out the statutory 
criteria for MTO site selection and the general outline of 
program operations. In March 1994, HUD selected five local 
public-housing authorities (PHAs) to participate in running 
the MTO demonstration. The sites selected were Baltimore, 
Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York. In its 
application, each PHA identified the public-housing and 
Section 8 project-based developments in high-poverty census 
tracts from which it would recruit families with children under 
eighteen. The PHAs also named a partner nonprofit agency to 
counsel the families assigned to the MTO treatment group.
The selected PHAs and nonprofit agencies were required to 
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management of most key aspects of the demonstration—
particularly research requirements. The core administrative 
responsibilities for implementing MTO were:
• outreach to landlords and families,
•e n r o l l m e n t  of families and creation of waiting lists,
• determination of family eligibility,
• random assignment, and
• counseling assistance for treatment-group families.
The PHAs and counseling agencies also helped implement 
MTO’s experimental design—including the collection of data 
on the participants and the program. Based on their prior 
experience and on the availability of local funding to 
supplement HUD’s grants, the counseling agencies varied the 
form and amount of counseling assistance offered to clients 
(Feins et al. 1997). This variation in treatment constitutes one 
of the limitations of MTO implementation. 
The PHAs began MTO operations by informing all eligible 
residents of the targeted public- and assisted-housing projects 
in high-poverty census tracts about what MTO offered and 
how to apply. In most instances, there were meetings of groups 
of tenants to explain the program and answer questions. 
Waiting lists of applicants were then established in each city, 
and small groups of applicants (working down from the top of 
the lists) were invited to orientation sessions. At these sessions, 
the applicants were informed about the experiment: that they 
would be randomly (or by lottery) assigned to one of three 
groups; that they had a chance of being offered Section 8 by 
joining; and that—if they were chosen by lottery for the 
treatment group—they would be provided training, 
counseling, and housing search assistance in order to move to 
a low-poverty area in the city or suburbs. Families were also 
informed that they were only required to remain in the low-
poverty area for the length of their first one-year lease; after 
that, they were permitted to move to any area under regular 
Section 8 rules.
The applicants were also informed of the screening criteria 
established by the PHA, including the fact that all tenants had 
to be current in their rent payments and that there could be no 
criminal record for any family member. Families who enrolled 
agreed in writing to cooperate with the information gathering 
and research needed for the demonstration, and they filled out 
a lengthy baseline survey. Random assignment occurred only 




In MTO, among the families eligible to apply, about one-
quarter chose to do so; roughly 5,300 families volunteered in 
the five cities. The families were then screened for eligibility 
with respect to: 1) having a child under eighteen in the family, 
2) being tenants in good standing (up-to-date in rent 
payments), 3) having all family members on the current lease, 
and 4) being without criminal background or history, as 
required (with some variation) by the local Section 8 program 
rules. In total, across the five sites, 4,608 families were found 
eligible and randomly assigned. With approximately 285 
vouchers for HUD to allocate per site, this was a sufficient 
number of volunteers for the demonstration. 
Fear of crime and the experience of criminal victimization 
were the major factors in families’ decisions to participate in 
the MTO demonstration. When applicants were asked during 
their baseline interviews why they wanted to move away from 
the public-housing developments in which they lived, more 
than half (54.8 percent) identified the fear of crime, gangs, and 
drugs as the principal motivation. 
In answer to whether those who volunteered for the MTO 
demonstration were typical of other residents from their 
public-housing developments, we learned that MTO 
households, compared with public-housing families who chose 
to remain, were somewhat different. They were younger (with 
heads of household thirty-five versus forty-one years old), 
more often female-headed (93 versus 78 percent), and less 
likely to be Hispanic (39 versus 45 percent). They were also 
slightly poorer (with an $8,200 versus $8,600 median income). 
Lease-Up
Prior research has shown that not all Section 8 certificate and 
voucher holders have been able to use their housing assistance, 
and that successful lease-up is influenced by applicant 
characteristics, market features, and market conditions (U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development 2000; Finkel 
and Buron 2001). Lease-up success rates also vary over time 
and among cities. For MTO, the lease-up rate for families in the 
demonstration’s Section 8 comparison group was roughly 
60 percent, while the rate for MTO treatment-group families 
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more than 61 percent in Los Angeles to a low of only 34 percent 
in Chicago.
There are a number of possible explanations for these lower 
rates, including the fact that families in MTO were already 
securely housed with project-based housing subsidies. They 
were much less needy than emergency applicants and 
significantly less burdened by housing costs than were other 
low-income renters without subsidies. Therefore, despite the 
high levels of crime reported by MTO families, the incentive to 
lease-up through MTO was apparently lower than that of the 
typical Section 8 applicant. The lower lease-up rates achieved 
with MTO clearly will affect any future replicability of the 
demonstration.
Understanding the characteristics and motivations of 
families that succeeded in renting an apartment through the 
MTO demonstration can also help researchers to generalize 
from MTO to the larger universe of public-housing families. 
For all five sites, Shroder (2002) shows that success in leasing-
up in MTO was positively associated both with families’ 
dissatisfaction with their original neighborhoods, and with 
their degree of confidence (at baseline) about finding a new 
unit. The level of housing counseling received by the treatment 
families also helped in achieving lease-up.
Would MTO Families Remain
in Low-Poverty Areas?
Did the families who moved out of public housing to low-
poverty areas remain there, or did they move back into more 
familiar, higher poverty communities after the one-year 
requirement was fulfilled? The answer to this question matters 
because the potential benefits of moves to communities of 
opportunity may take years to accrue. Social science literature 
suggests that positive effects on child development, educational 
outcomes, and adult prospects (compared with continued life 
in public housing in deeply poor areas) might occur in a five-
to-ten-year time frame, but only if the families remained in 
distinctly different neighborhoods (Leventhal and Brooks-
Gunn 2001).
An examination of data from a 1997 HUD-funded survey of 
all the MTO families who joined the program from 1994 to 
1996 shows that more than a third (34.5 percent) of the MTO 
treatment group—but just 10.6 percent of the comparison 
group, and less than 3 percent of the in-place group—was 
living in low-poverty neighborhoods. Although roughly 
45 percent of the treatment group was living in high-poverty 
areas, those tenants were largely the nonmovers (those who 
remained in their initial public-housing developments), 
compared with 38 percent of the Section 8 comparison group 
and 74 percent of the control group.
4. MTO Research Findings to Date:
First-Stage Research
Research results concerning MTO to date derive from studies 
conducted by seven HUD-commissioned teams of social 
scientists; each team worked in one of the five MTO locations. 
These teams used a number of different data sources, including 
HUD administrative data; baseline survey data; data from 
follow-up surveys of enrolled families; some qualitative 
interviews; and some administrative data on juvenile crime, 
labor-market outcomes, and school performance. The initial 
studies covered various topics, used differing approaches, 
and were carried out by researchers from a range of 
disciplines.
As each team made use of differing analytic and 
methodological strategies, the resulting lack of comparability 
across sites is a limitation of MTO research to date. Further, 
initial research projects focused on establishing whether any 
early effects would appear soon after the transitions from 
inner-city projects. They did not focus on which institutions or 
processes caused improvement in the lives of children or adults 
(Sampson, Morenoff, and Gannon-Rowley 2002).
A number of statistically significant ITT results, for the 
groups as assigned, have been found in the early research 
undertaken on MTO families. Tables 1-3 present findings from 
different single-site research projects that have tested for 
statistically significant differences between the two treatment 
groups and the control group. The tables provide an overview 
of research results for three sets of issues: Table 1 presents 
findings on neighborhoods, Table 2 on outcomes for children, 
and Table 3 on outcomes for adults.
The focus here is on ITT effects, which are measured by 
considering the difference between the average outcome for the 
entire MTO treatment group, or the entire Section 8 
comparison group, and the outcome for the control group. For 
example, the average poverty rate for census tracts occupied by 
members of the treatment group was 32.3 percent in 1997. The 
intent-to-treat effect is the difference between that rate and the 
control group’s average poverty rate (48.1 percent); thus, the 
ITT effect is 15.8 percent. The treatment-on-treated (TOT) 
effect—that is, the estimated effect on those persons who 
successfully leased up under MTO—is generally higher, as it is 
measured for only those participants who actually took up the 
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below, we mainly focus on intent-to-treat effects, noting that 
whenever ITT effects are statistically significant, TOT effects 
are typically significant and stronger. 
4.1 Neighborhood and School 
Characteristics
Table 1 reports differences in the neighborhood and school 
characteristics of the areas in which MTO participants live. 
Three critical outcomes follow from this research.
MTO Families Live in More Economically
and Racially Mixed Communities
The 1997 survey of families at all five MTO sites enables us to 
examine whether residential locations differed significantly 
among the randomly assigned groups. After their initial moves 
and one-year leases, treatment-group families were no longer 
constrained to live in low-poverty areas. Despite this, one to 
three years after random assignment, treatment-group families 
lived in significantly more affluent and more racially mixed 
Table 1
Early Evidence of MTO Impacts: Differences in Characteristics of Neighborhoods













Differences in neighborhood after
  one to three yearsa
All sites All households in 
MTO as of 12/31/96
Poverty percentage of current location 32.3** 33.4** 48.1
Median income of current location $24,075** $21,246** $13,920
Percentage black population of current location 38.2** 40.3 48.6
Differences in total crime rate per 100,000 population
  in census tractb
Los Angeles Households in MTO 
as of 12/18/96
6,137.25** 5,984.21** 8,018.40
Differences in average test scores for schools attended
  by MTO children in 1997c
Boston Households in MTO 
as of 5/96
School’s percentile, reading test score 15.9** 10.9 8.3
School’s percentile, math test score 16.0** 12.6 9.9
Differences in resources and characteristics scores for schools attended
  by MTO children after random assignment and initial relocationd
Baltimore School-age children of 
all households in MTO 
Percentage children receiving free lunch 66.82** 80.82* 84.82
Fifth-grade raw reading test pass rate 11.84** 7.84** 5.84
Fifth-grade raw math test pass rate 18.40** 15.40** 12.40
Differences in perceived safety
  of current neighborhoode
Baltimore Adults in MTO as
of 9/4/97
Percentage reporting neighborhood has drug and crime problems 27.8** 60.8 —
Differences in perceived safety
  of current neighborhoodf
Los Angeles Adults in MTO
as of 12/18/96
Percentage reporting very safe neighborhood 27.5* 6.7 10.1
Notes: MTO is the Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing Demonstration. Differences reported are based on intent-to-treat comparisons (full group) 
rather than adjusted treatment-on-treated results.
aSource: Feins (2000, Exhibit 9).
bSource: Hanratty, McLanahan, and Pettit (2001, Table 6).
cSource: Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001, Table 4).
dSource: Ludwig and Ladd (forthcoming, Table 9).
eSource: Norris and Bembry (2001, Table 16).
fSource: Hanratty, McLanahan, Pettit (2001, Table 7).
  *Statistically significant difference from in-place control group (intent-to-treat effect) at p less than the .10 level.
**Statistically significant difference from in-place control group (intent-to-treat effect) at p less than the .05 level.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / June 2003 121
communities than either the Section 8 comparison-group or 
the in-place control-group families. 
Late in 1997, the average poverty rate of residential locations 
for the MTO treatment-group families and the Section 8 
comparison-group families was significantly lower (by 15 to 
16 percentage points) than the poverty rates of areas in which 
in-place control-group families lived. Moreover, median 
incomes in the treatment-group families’ neighborhoods were 
73 percent higher than median incomes in the control-group 
neighborhoods and they were 53 percent higher in the 
Section 8-only group locations compared with the controls. 
There were also significant differences in the racial 
composition of the areas. In each of the five metropolitan sites 
in 1997, the MTO treatment-group families lived in less 
segregated neighborhoods than either the Section 8 
comparison-group families or those who remained in place. 
Using the percentage black population as an indicator, there 
was a statistically significant 10-percentage-point reduction in 
black population in the treatment-group families’ locations—
compared with the locations of control-group families. But 
there was no significant difference for Section 8-only families 
(Feins forthcoming). Future analyses will make use of census 
2000 tract-level data to examine how much the new 
neighborhoods have changed since 1990.
MTO Families Live in Areas with Lower Crime Rates
Measured at the census-tract level, in total crimes per 100,000 
population, the places where MTO treatment-group families 
and Section 8 comparison-group families were living had 
significantly fewer crimes in Los Angeles. The reduction was 
23 percent for the former and 25 percent for the latter group. 
The fact that regular Section 8 families benefited from moves 
from high-poverty projects is an important finding mirrored in 
some other early outcomes.
Schools Currently Attended by MTO Children 
Are Better
Research teams in both Boston and Baltimore demonstrated 
that schoolwide reading and math scores or pass rates were 
significantly better in treatment-group children’s schools 
relative to the schools attended by children of in-place control-
group families. In Baltimore, these indicators were also 
significantly better for the schools of children from Section 8-
only families.
Families’ Views of Their Neighborhoods 
Have Improved
The early MTO research has also demonstrated significant 
betterment in families’ views of their neighborhoods. These 
views contrast with the higher levels of fear and dissatisfaction 
expressed by MTO applicants at baseline.
MTO Families Have Become Less Fearful
As noted earlier, many families enrolled in MTO because of 
their fear of the crime conditions surrounding them in their 
public-housing or Section 8 project-based developments. Most 
of the MTO research teams reported that freedom from this 
fear is among the earliest, clearest outcomes.
As shown in Table 1, significantly fewer Baltimore families 
in the treatment group reported neighborhood problems with 
drugs and crime, compared with reports from the Section 8 
comparison group. A significantly higher proportion of MTO 
treatment-group members in Los Angeles reported very safe 
neighborhoods at follow-up, compared with those in the 
control group, but the difference between the Section 8 
comparison group and the in-place control group was not 
found to be significant. In Chicago, MTO mothers were asked 
about the risks and opportunities their current locations 
offered to teenagers. Those in the MTO treatment group 
reported significantly reduced risks in comparison with their 
old locations, but those in the Section 8 comparison group did 
not. 
4.2 Outcomes for Children
Turning to early evidence of MTO impacts on individuals in 
the demonstration, we present in Table 2 findings on children’s 
behavior, health, and educational achievement, as well as 
results concerning youth involvement in violent crime.
The Boston research team found that there were 
significantly fewer behavior problems among boys in both the 
MTO treatment and the regular Section 8 groups relative to 
boys in the in-place group. A significantly higher proportion of 
girls in both treatment groups reported at least one close friend 
in the neighborhood. Treatment-group children were also less 
likely to be injured or to have an asthma attack. In fact, among 
children with asthma in Boston, there was a substantial 
reduction in the number of attacks requiring medical attention 
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There Have Been Educational Improvements
In addition to the signs indicating that the children are 
attending better schools (Table 1), Ludwig, Ladd, and Duncan 
(2001) report direct evidence of the effect of MTO in Baltimore 
upon the school performance of individual children. The 
researchers used standardized reading and math scores 
(obtained from schools) for a sample of Baltimore children and 
matched them to identifying information for the MTO 
subjects. Despite data limitations, the results revealed 
statistically significant improvements for the treatment group. 
However, in the early research, no direct educational testing of 
children in MTO families was conducted. Such testing is now 
under way, and results should become available in 2004.
There Have Been Declines in Juvenile Crime
In another Baltimore study, researchers using outcome 
measures from juvenile arrest records taken from 
administrative (police and court) data reported that providing 
families with the opportunity to move to lower poverty 
neighborhoods reduced arrests for violent criminal behavior by 
teenagers in those families. They showed that one to one-and-
a-half years after random assignment, arrests for violent crime 
of male juveniles in the treatment group declined relative to 
those in the control group. But the difference for boys from the 
Section 8-only group was not statistically significant. 
Reductions in robbery accounted for about half of this decline. 
The research also examined whether teens in the treatment 
Table 2













Differences in child 
  behaviora
Boston Children ages six to fifteen in house-
holds in MTO as of 5/96
Percentage with seven behavior problems, boys 23.6** 21.3** 32.6
Percentage with seven behavior problems, girls 17.0 14.3 19.3
Percentage with at least one close friend in neighborhood, boys 73.8 72.8 74.7
Percentage with at least one close friend in neighborhood, girls 67.7** 63.3** 82.3
Differences in child
  healtha
Boston Children ages six to fifteen
in households in MTO as of 5/96
Percentage with any asthma attack requiring medical
  attention in past six months
4.7* 9.4 9.8
Percentage with any accident or injury requiring medical
  attention in past six months
4.6* 6.8 10.5
Differences in number of arrests per 100 juveniles
  ages eleven to sixteenb
Baltimore Children ages eleven
to sixteen in all MTO households
Arrests for violent crimes 1.4** 1.6* 3.0
Differences in school test scoresc Baltimore Children ages five to twelve in all 
MTO households
Elementary school CTBS percentile reading scores 32.47** 31.52** 25.13
Elementary school CTBS percentile math scores 36.25** 30.25 28.77
Notes: MTO is the Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing Demonstration; CTBS is the Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills. Differences reported are based 
on intent-to-treat comparisons (full group) rather than adjusted treatment-on-treated results.
aSource: Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001, Table 6).
bSource: Ludwig, Duncan, and Hirschfield (2001, Table 3).
cSource: Ludwig, Ladd, and Duncan (2000, Table 6).
  *Statistically significant difference from in-place control group (intent-to-treat effect) at p less than the .10 level.
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group had higher rates of property-crime arrests relative to the 
control group. The result was not statistically significant once 
differences in preprogram characteristics were controlled. The 
issue of whether or not property crime increases in receiving 
neighborhoods has been raised repeatedly by opponents of 
mobility programs (see, for example, Husock [2000]), and it is 
an ongoing research issue for MTO.
 4.3Outcomes for Adults
in MTO Families
There are also some significant early impact findings on the 
well-being of MTO adults (Table 3).
Table 3













Differences in depressive behaviorsa New York All mothers in MTO through 
12/31/98
Percentage unhappy, sad, or depressed 33.0** 46.2 50.6
Differences in adult healthb Boston Adults in MTO as of 5/96
Percentage reporting overall health is good or better 69.3** 74.0** 57.8
Welfare and labor market effects
Differences in welfare and labor market effects
  for household headsc
All sites Adults in MTO surveyed via 
1997 long-form canvassd
Average percentage on welfare 58.0 58.0 57.0
Average percentage employed 35.0 34.0 37.0
Average number of weekly hours worked 33.3 31.5 33.9
Differences in rate of welfare
  receipte
Baltimore Adults in all MTO
households
Average percentage of  household heads on welfare during
  thirteen quarters after random assignment
38.0** 41.0 44.0







Differences in adult economic outcomesg Boston Adults in MTO as of 5/96
Percentage adults receiving public assistance seven to nine quarters
  after random assignment
49.9 46.0 49.5
Percentage adults with employment earnings seven to nine quarters
  after random assignment
44.4 46.3 43.4
Notes: MTO is the Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing Demonstration. Differences reported are based on intent-to-treat comparisons (full group) 
rather than adjusted treatment-on-treated results.
aSource: Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn (forthcoming, Table 6).
bSource: Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001, Table 9).
cSource: Goering, Feins, and Richardson (2002).
dThe long form was administered to households participating in the MTO under the original random-assignment ratio.
eSource: Ludwig, Duncan, and Pinkston (2000).
fSource: Hanratty, McLanahan, and Pettit (2001, Table 8).
gSource: Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001, Table 7).
  *Statistically significant difference from in-place control group (intent-to-treat effect) at p less than the .10 level.
**Statistically significant difference from in-place control group (intent-to-treat effect) at p less than the .05 level.124 The Impacts of New Neighborhoods on Poor Families
Adults Have Experienced Improved Physical 
and Mental Health
In New York, parents in the MTO treatment group reported 
significantly better health and emotional well-being than those 
in the control group, while Section 8 comparison-group 
parents enjoyed more modest improvements. Treatment-
group mothers were much less likely to report being depressed 
or feeling tense. Treatment-group parents also provided more 
structure for their children and were less restrictive in 
parenting. These effects were measured using standard 
batteries of interview questions, developed and tested in 
previous child and family research. Improvements in adult 
health were found in Boston, too. There adults in both the 
treatment and regular Section 8 groups were more likely to 
report that their overall health was good or better. There were 
also indications of reduced stress.
Changes in Welfare Status and Wages
When MTO was designed, it was expected that moving from a 
high-poverty community to a low-poverty community would 
have a gradual positive effect on employment for adults, since 
social science evidence suggests that a complicated set of factors 
is involved in improving the work situations and wages of 
inner-city minority families. Job discrimination in new 
communities, poor access to jobs by public or private 
transportation, and limited human capital (skills) all could be 
involved in constraining the possibility of a poor person’s 
obtaining a better paying job (O’Regan and Quigley 1999, 
p. 458). Simply relocating families to a community whose 
residents are employed at good jobs will not necessarily, or 
quickly, translate into increased human capital for newcomers. 
Nor did the Gautreaux research suggest that poor families from 
public housing could be easily or quickly absorbed into local 
labor markets, particularly given the decline in the 1980s of 
well-paid jobs available to persons with limited education and 
skills (Duncan and Rodgers 1991, p. 549).
When MTO was authorized, there was also little expectation 
for major reform of welfare laws. However, following the end 
of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, and 
the inception of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
program, the number of families on welfare nationwide 
dropped by roughly half, at least partially as a result of the 
enactment of new welfare statutes (Schoeni and Blank 2000; 
Weaver 2000). In 1994, 5.5 percent of the total U.S. population 
was receiving welfare, while by 1999 the proportion had 
declined to 2.3 percent (Kaushal and Kaestner 2000).
Before MTO began, only 44 percent of single mothers 
nationwide were employed; by 1999, the proportion had 
increased to 65 percent. This transformation is the subject of 
several major research projects that are investigating whether 
former welfare recipients, like most of the MTO family heads, 
are leaving welfare for work (Kaushal and Kaestner 2000, 
pp. 2-3). And this transformation may have affected 
participants in MTO across all three randomly assigned 
groups.
Have MTO mothers experienced any changes in their 
welfare and economic situation? Research on the wage growth 
of low-income workers suggests that only modest changes can 
be expected. Low-wage workers typically earn wage increases of 
only 4 to 6 percent for a year of full-time employment, and 
such increases are often less for both black men and women 
(Gladden and Taber 2000, p. 189).
MTO researchers at two sites have examined these issues 
(Table 3). Researchers in Baltimore used state unemployment 
insurance records to learn whether MTO families there had 
experienced any detectable change in welfare status or 
earnings. Their data covered the period from 1985 to 1999, or 
an average of 3.8 years of post-program information on the 
MTO families. The researchers found that the number of 
treatment-group families on welfare during the post-program 
period was 6 percentage points lower than the number for the 
in-place control group. In addition, the Section 8 comparison 
group’s rate of welfare receipt was 5 percentage points lower 
than that of the in-place control group in the first program 
year. This latter margin dissipated in subsequent years, while 
the gap between the treatment and control groups grew to 
nearly 10 percentage points by the third year. That is, 
assignment to the treatment group reduced welfare receipt 
relative to controls—but assignment to the Section 8 group had 
little effect beyond the first year.
The researchers did not, however, find any significant 
change in either employment or earnings. This was somewhat 
unexpected, since the treatment group reported in interviews 
that there were better job and training opportunities in their 
new neighborhoods (Ludwig, Duncan, and Pinkston 2000, 
p. 31). The authors conclude that “these differences in welfare-
to-work transitions are . . . not reflected in quarterly earnings 
data from the state UI [unemployment insurance] system, 
because many of the jobs and earnings changes are not 
captured by the UI data” (p. 29).
In Boston, the receipt of public assistance by MTO families 
dropped by half, and employment for all groups increased by 
more than half. Employment rates for the full MTO population 
increased from 27 percent at the time of baseline interview to 
43 percent one to three years later. However, the MTO 
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earnings of household heads, as revealed in Massachusetts 
administrative earnings data on household heads. Nor did 
MTO treatment affect welfare receipt in the three years after 
random assignment up through December 1998.
Multisite data from the 1997 MTO canvass also serve as a 
test of short-term impacts of MTO on employment, public 
assistance, hours worked, and weekly wages for heads of 
household. The data show that an average of 2.4 years after 
random assignment, substantially more heads of household 
across the sites were employed, and many fewer were receiving 
public assistance. Employment rates for MTO heads of 
household rose 14 percentage points in that interval, while 
public assistance rates fell 16 percentage points. However, 
Table 3 shows that despite (or perhaps because of) these 
dramatic changes in employment and welfare rates, there was 
no significant difference between the three groups in terms of 
employment rates, hours worked per week, or use of public 
assistance at the time of the 1997 canvass.
5. Current Research Limitations 
and Future Research Needs
There are a number of limitations to the MTO design and 
research that need to be kept in mind in evaluating the study 
results reported earlier in this paper. The families who 
volunteered to join MTO were somewhat different from others 
in the same public-housing developments that chose not to 
join. In addition, PHA screening requirements may have 
caused some families to decide against applying, thus 
eliminating a number of other families during eligibility 
determination. Moreover, the relatively low lease-up rates 
achieved for both of the random-assignment groups receiving 
Section 8 certificates or vouchers are important because ITT 
effects are measured across entire groups. The effects of better 
neighborhoods can only be experienced by families who move 
and—for the group as a whole—such effects are “diluted” by 
the portion of the group that does not move. Thus, the lease-up 
rates are also central to the detection of program effects.
There are also limitations to a demonstration program that 
delivers benefits to only half the families who join. The regular 
Section 8 lease-up rate for MTO families was only 60 percent, 
considerably lower than the rate in the overall program in the 
same cities at that time. The lease-up rate for the MTO 
experimental group was lower still. Comparing just the 
experimental and regular Section 8 groups, Shroder (2002) 
estimates that for the MTO demonstration as a whole, the 
locational constraint—even with effective counseling—
reduced the probability of lease-up by roughly 14 percentage 
points.
Also, in the period of MTO enrollment, particularly
1994-95, central-city crime rates were quite high. Drive-by 
shootings, gang wars, and drug-related violence were a 
common feature of life in the neighborhoods where MTO 
families were living. These phenomena likely affected the 
motivation to join MTO and may well have made people more 
interested in joining the demonstration than they might 
otherwise have been.
Another consequence of MTO’s mid-decade timing was 
that the census data used to identify high-poverty areas (from 
which to recruit families) and low-poverty areas (to which 
experimental group families could move) were outdated. MTO 
housing counselors in MTO sites frequently raised questions 
about the suitability of certain census tracts that technically 
met the low-poverty definition. Use of the poverty rate as the 
sole criterion for identifying opportunity areas also has 
limitations, and this may have been particularly misleading at 
mid-decade. When census 2000 tract-level data become fully 
available in 2002, it may turn out that some of the areas chosen 
by experimental-group families were not actually low-poverty 
communities.
As noted earlier, because each of the initial MTO research 
studies was based upon a unique design, results are often 
applicable to only one MTO site, and sample sizes are quite 
small. As tests of statistical significance are strongly affected by 
sample sizes, it is possible that different conclusions would be 
reached in MTO research if the tests could be conducted on 
larger, multisite samples.
Certain other aspects of the demonstration’s implementation 
also limit the ability to generalize from MTO results. In MTO, 
the treatment received by families assigned to the experimental 
group included both a location-restricted housing voucher and 
some form of counseling to assist in leasing-up. The services 
provided by the nonprofit counseling organizations to the 
treatment-group families varied in breadth, depth, and 
intensity across the sites (Feins et al. 1997), a factor that 
might lead to some differences in program impacts. For 
example, differences in counseling affected lease-up rates 
(Feins et al. 1997; Shroder 2002) and perhaps also affected 
how well families in the treatment group adapted to their new 
neighborhoods and how long they remained in low-poverty 
areas. In three sites, a single nonprofit provided counseling 
throughout the demonstration period. The effects of any 
distinctive practices at these three agencies could easily be 
confounded with the effects of the site-specific housing market 
and other factors.
Finally, while considerable evidence has been gathered from 
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occurred as a result of participation in MTO, little is known 
about why and how these changes took place. That is, there is 
currently a dearth of information about the neighborhood 
processes related to reported outcomes.
Yet larger samples and a clearer understanding of causality 
are not sufficient for MTO to be counted among the small 
number of successful policy experiments. Crane (1998, 
pp. 1-2) lists the criteria he judges relevant in deciding whether 
a new social program has been successful. These include 
“unusually convincing evidence that the program delivers 
substantial benefits regardless of cost . . . convincing evidence 
of long-term effects; and new hope of making progress to solve 
a seemingly intractable social problem.” He also includes 
measures of the program’s cost-benefit relationships as another 
central concern.2
For MTO to be counted a clear policy success, it must 
demonstrate major long-term impacts achieved in a cost-
effective manner. MTO’s average counseling costs of roughly 
$3,000 per family (those who leased-up a unit) would need to 
be offset by evidence concerning reductions in such 
expenditures as health care costs, unemployment, welfare 
enrollment, crime reduction, improvements in educational 
attainment and labor force engagement, and other measurable 
impacts. MTO’s long-term research plan, as it is currently 
configured, has the capability to generate the evidence 
necessary to assess how well the program works.
5.1 The Next Stage in the Evaluation 
of MTO’s Effects
Before discussing the specific issues and questions that appear 
to warrant further inquiry, it is helpful for the reader to 
appreciate that MTO was designed with a research plan 
consisting of a number of stages of interconnected data 
collection and analysis. Each stage is oriented toward the 
completion of a final impact evaluation and data release. The 
first stages have either been completed or have received 
funding from HUD and other agencies. Design and 
implementation, including random-assignment procedures, 
were completed by 1998. The results from the small-grant 
research projects at each of the five MTO locations are reported 
in this paper. Two waves of regular surveys of MTO families to 
determine their current location have already been conducted.
Recently, a multimillion-dollar midterm evaluation has 
been funded and is under way. The only remaining portion of 
the MTO research plan is the final, longer term impact 
assessment. In the following section, we briefly outline 
suggestions as to the key research and evaluation issues that 
emerge from the first set of analyses of the outcomes from the 
MTO experiment.
For Which Social Outcomes Are There Comparable, 
Statistically Powerful Results?
Persevering to make full use of the longitudinal character of 
MTO’s panel design will permit, for the first time, the 
answering of questions about the power and role of 
neighborhoods in affecting the lives of deeply poor families 
across all five MTO sites. The next stage of research will make 
use of standardized, common instruments—rather than the 
unique research plans and instruments that were used in the 
first stage of MTO research. The full MTO sample can be used 
to learn whether statistically meaningful effects occur across all 
sites and what those effects are. This analysis will permit an 
understanding of whether there are major differences between 
types of families and the sites in the ways in which families 
respond to the MTO treatment. 
Are the Changes in Parents’ and Children’s Lives 
Long-Lasting or Reversible?
Time will also permit us to understand the extent to which any 
positive effects persist, diminish, or grow in strength. It is 
unclear whether we can confidently predict that once a child or 
parent has achieved some degree of positive improvement in, 
say, employment, health, or education, that these changes will 
continue. Are parents’ and children’s lives permanently and 
irreversibly altered by MTO, or is there some degree of reversal 
or “backsliding”? Do treatment-group children’s futures 
dramatically improve as they move on to college and better 
paying jobs compared with their control-group colleagues? Or 
does the appeal of low-poverty areas wear thin? And do families 
retreat to their former, more familiar communities? Do the 
appeal and benefits of more affluent neighborhoods become 
depleted if parents’ isolation and loneliness overwhelm them? 
Will Parents as Well as Children Benefit from, 
or Be Harmed by, MTO?
The bulk of the research reported in this collection suggests 
that children’s and teenagers’ behavior and health have more 
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and health. Although many mothers feel better and appear 
more positive about their futures, we still do not know if 
previously unemployed adults’ employment situations and 
wages will improve. The absence of any experimental change in 
labor-market outcomes is an area where more time might 
result in learning whether this crucial outcome is amenable to 
MTO-driven change. Perhaps MTO was not the right, or 
sufficient, demonstration to improve the employment 
potential and incomes of deeply poor mothers because we 
know from studies of labor-market programs that there are a 
host of complicated interventions that might be required 
before we can legitimately expect to see major improvements in 
the job situations of low-income adults from poor 
communities (Haveman 1994; O’Regan and Quigley 1999, 
pp. 458-9).
The opposite of these questions is clear: will MTO prove 
harmful to significant numbers of adults or children? Will 
mothers or grandmothers who moved from their former 
neighborhood find themselves lonely and isolated in a 
community without friends, religious groups, or other familiar 
ties that they spent decades acquiring? Will teenagers be 
subjected to more police scrutiny and risk as a result of moving 
to areas unaccustomed or resistant to their presence? Will 
landlords in the new communities treat their new Section 8 
tenants with indifference, or worse? What, if any, harm has 
been caused to families who moved, how severe is it, and how 
long-lasting might the effects be?
Why Have Changes Occurred?
For many of the statistical and quantitative statements in this 
collection, we have only a limited sense of why they have 
happened. Quantitative measures of school, health, and 
criminal outcomes do not tell us the reasons for positive change 
and personal transformation. Why have teenagers in Baltimore 
stopped committing as much violent crime? Why has there 
been a decline in asthma cases in Boston? How did younger 
children in the treatment group achieve such improvements in 
their reading tests? Ellen and Turner (1997) are also curious 
about what has caused families’ lives to change, and to what 
degree their neighborhoods are the cause. Qualitative or 
ethnographic research is one tool needed to look inside the 
“black box” of experimental effects to understand better those 
institutions, networks, and processes that have leveraged 
change in adults, children, or both.
Will There Be Any Significant Negative Impacts 
on the Surrounding Neighborhood?
Galster (forthcoming), among a number of social scientists, asks 
whether MTO families might affect the overall rate of problematic 
behavior in both the sending and the receiving neighborhoods. He 
assumes that moving those families will not have a major impact, 
but wonders whether the move of a low-income family from 
one neighborhood to another will result in a corresponding 
shift of problematic behavior from sending to destination 
neighborhoods. Are changes in socially problematic behavior 
“capitalized” into corresponding changes in neighborhood 
property values, and thus indirectly measurable through these 
means? Is there a neighborhood concentration “threshold,” he 
asks, of low-income families, after which rates of problematic 
behavior increase (Turner, Popkin, and Cunningham 2000)? 
Has MTO done any measurable harm to the communities 
into which MTO families have moved that can be causally 
attributed to the demonstration? Can an impact on the tiny 
scale of the MTO movers, roughly 285 families in each of the 
five sites, be detected reasonably amidst the welter of other 
social, economic, racial, and attitudinal alterations that 
normally occur in the life-course of any neighborhood?
It is essential for future researchers to develop measures of 
actual or perceived impacts to address how the receiving 
communities or neighborhoods react to small numbers of low-
income, largely minority, public-housing families. We may 
learn that the receiving community neighbors and 
neighborhood organizations are not all alike (Guhathakurta 
and Mushkatel 2002). They might well have different 
thresholds of tolerance and acceptance for children and adults 
of varying racial and ethnic groups, depending on their own 
racial and ethnic composition, their perceived vulnerability or 
susceptibility to other changes, and their access to social 
resources and programs that might be useful to new families.
5.2 Understanding the Costs and Benefits
One potential result of future research will be a clearer 
understanding of the net costs of an MTO program, including 
an appreciation of savings that result from improved outcomes 
for treatment-group families. How does the cost of MTO 
counseling compare with other social and economic costs and 
benefits to families? Are improved test scores, lower levels of 
welfare use, and lower violent crime rates common across all 
sites? If so, what do these improvements “save” government 
agencies compared with the higher costs for treatment-group 
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At the end of this research, it will likely be important to 
recall that experimental research projects will almost certainly 
have problems of external validity. Manski (2000, p. 126) has 
cautioned, “the groups whose interactions are observed are 
formed artificially for the sake of the experiment. This raises 
obvious questions about extrapolating findings from 
experimental settings to populations of interest.” Higher levels 
of attention by PHAs to tenants during the recruitment stage of 
a demonstration such as MTO may result in attracting families 
unlike those not involved. There is some risk, therefore, that 
results that emerge from MTO may not readily translate into a 
national program for remaining families. “It may be hazardous 
to generalize from the treatment effects on members of the 
experimental sample to some larger population” (Shroder 
2000, p. 256).
6. Policy Issues and Concerns
One response to this paper’s positive results might be to build 
the MTO model into something closer to a national program to 
link intensive housing counseling to geographically limited 
housing vouchers. To others, the improved level of 
employment reported for all MTO families may reflect the 
impact that macroeconomic improvements can have on the 
lives of most Americans, suggesting that overall economic 
improvement is a policy priority (Haveman 1994, p. 440; 
Danziger 2002). Yet some may find the single-site results 
reported within this collection unpersuasive. Should MTO, 
then, be abandoned as a policy option, or is there enough 
relevant information to warrant proposing that MTO be 
adopted on a more permanent basis as a tool for local housing 
agencies?
An important predicate for attempting to answer these 
questions is to appreciate the fact that HUD was implementing 
alternative opportunities for public-housing families at the 
same time that MTO was being implemented. Among the key 
alternative policy options was, and is, the Hope VI program.
6.1 The Option to Stay: Rebuilding
Inner-City Projects
A necessary part of the context for appreciating MTO’s design 
and implementation was the fact that it was not “the only game 
in town” for public-housing families in 1994. One of the 
parallel programs whose purpose and implementation directly, 
if inadvertently, affected MTO was an initiative demolishing 
many of the worst public-housing projects in larger cities—the 
very projects from which some MTO families would be enabled 
to move. The new program was Hope VI.3 The program’s goal 
was to enable families to relocate, using Section 8 so that some 
proportion of them would return to their old communities 
after their public-housing buildings had been fully refurbished.
With congressional backing, HUD provided funding for 
Hope VI to demolish the most troubled urban public-housing 
projects and replace them with rebuilt mixed-income 
communities. The initial goal was to tear down roughly 
100,000 units (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development 1996). Such rebuilding efforts, however, 
encountered problems in regenerating their communities. In 
part, this was because the communities remained troubled with 
crime and gangs, relocation efforts were sometimes badly 
managed, and some tenants resisted efforts to move them from 
their familiar neighborhoods (Popkin 2000, pp. 181-90). 
In several cities that were selected for MTO, families had the 
choice of remaining or returning to a remodeled public-
housing development. MTO-eligible families, beginning in 
1994, frequently knew that they had the choice to stay and wait 
for better housing or to relocate. Families in Boston, for 
example, had seen the drawings of their soon-to-be-
refurbished public-housing development and often opted to 
remain because the refurbished housing appeared attractive. In 
Baltimore, several family housing projects near the downtown 
core of the city were being demolished and replaced with 
mixed-income housing as MTO began tenant selection. Some 
families told us they preferred to remain and see what would 
result.
MTO was not designed to be the “silver bullet” to end ghetto 
poverty, nor was it intended to be the only choice available to 
public-housing residents. It was but one of a set of choices that 
public-housing applicants and residents could and should be 
offered, including the right to stay in place and the option to 
move into nonpoor neighborhoods (Brown and Richman 
1997; Downs 1994, pp. 112-4). Whether the outcomes of 
Hope VI will result in a net advantage for former residents is 
yet to be determined (Salama 1999; Goetz 2000; Dimond 2000, 
p. 260). Perhaps Hope VI and MTO will only work best in 
aiding residents when larger policies and economic forces—
including welfare reform and a strong economy—provide 
simultaneous reinforcement (Weisberg 2000). Only time and 
carefully conducted research will provide answers to the 
question of what mix of rebuilding and mobility is right for 
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6.2 Going “to Scale”?
Perhaps the most frequently asked question when MTO is 
discussed among social scientists and policy analysts is what 
might “bringing MTO to scale” be like? Thompson (1999, 
p. 126), for example, appears certain that MTO could not 
become a general, large-scale program—at least in the New 
York area. “Given the fierce resistance,” he argues, “to even 
modest public-housing development in nearby Yonkers, the 
notion that significant portions of the NYCPHA [New York 
City Public Housing Authority] population could be integrated 
into Long Island and Westchester is fanciful. Political problems 
aside, HUD’s entire $70 million national MTO budget would 
have only a minor impact on deconcentrating public housing 
in New York City.” 
Political opposition and costs have been familiar obstacles 
to prior HUD efforts to promote either economic or racial 
mobility. Heclo (1994, p. 422) also reminds us of this: “dealing 
in any realistic way with this socioeconomic catastrophe 
(poverty) is going to be costly and will demand a long-term 
commitment to people whom many Americans would not 
want as neighbors. This is the dirty little secret buried in the 
shelves of social science poverty studies.”
Another potential obstacle to the future of a demonstration 
like MTO is what future the Section 8 program will have. 
Husock (2000), a frequent critic, states that “in the blue-collar 
and middle-class neighborhoods where voucher holders 
increasingly live, longtime residents hate the program. It 
undermines and destabilizes their communities by importing 
social problems into their midst. . . .” Part of his solution is to 
leave families in conventional public-housing projects fixed so 
that residents would be both time-limited and required to get 
“instruction in parenting.” If this does not work, he argues, “no 
system at all would be better than Section 8 vouchers.” Such 
criticism, however, now appears to be marginal to the 
mainstream public policy debate over federal housing policy.
There are, however, fairly constant complaints about undue 
concentration of voucher recipients. There is the growing sense 
that the Section 8 program, left to its own devices, will create 
submarkets or niches within which Section 8 families will be 
served—just as project-based housing has done (Stegman 
2000, p. 93). If, and as, the Section 8 program continues to 
grow, it may be subject to increasing criticism for contributing 
to such concentrations of poverty. The program seems likely to 
need a new generation of policy tools to help families who wish 
to move to communities with lower levels of poverty.
In addition, some worry that the regular Section 8 program 
already has too high a level of failure in moving families into 
private rental apartments. Even the fact that only 80 to 
85 percent of families can lease-up under the regular program 
appears a cause for concern. Stegman (2000, p. 93), for 
example, argues that “because a voucher can be a ticket out of 
a ghetto into a middle-class neighborhood, with better schools 
and services, we should be concerned about the 15 percent of 
families who cannot use their voucher to find acceptable 
housing in the private sector.” How to promote access to better 
neighborhoods and to also increase lease-up rates is a major 
part of the ongoing policy conundrum for which MTO does 
not provide an answer. Lease-up rates of roughly 50 to 
60 percent are not the solution to moving large numbers of 
families promptly into the rental market.
There is then an explicit policy trade-off between getting 
needy families into private rental housing quickly at a high 
lease-up rate versus getting them access to low-poverty areas at 
a lower success rate. If, for example, a family with average 
characteristics in a city like Los Angeles can receive regular 
Section 8 assistance with no counseling services, it has a lease-
up probability of roughly 70 percent based upon MTO 
evidence. If, however, another MTO family receives the highest 
intensity counseling services and is required to lease-up in a 
low-poverty area, its lease-up probability is roughly 
50 percent—a 20-percentage-point reduction. This appears to 
be a considerable cost. Whatever positive results are traded off 
against it, the decisions about MTO’s future will not be simple. 
Some families will rightly be unwilling to voluntarily cede their 
ability to locate in higher poverty areas except on the same basis 
that they did in MTO; that is, they would otherwise have no 
access to a Section 8 subsidy.
To address the policy question of whether the lease-up rates 
in MTO were “too low,” current evidence is needed about how 
well the general Section 8 program succeeds in leasing-up 
families without any restrictions or counseling assistance. How 
well does the regular program succeed in cities such as New 
York and Los Angeles? A recent report suggests interestingly 
that there has been a notable overall drop in the ability of 
families to make use of their rental vouchers (Finkel and 
Buron 2001). Lease-up rates declined from more than 80 percent 
in 1993, just as MTO was being planned, to only 69 percent 
in 2000. The report notes that, “PHAs generally attribute the 
decline in success rates between 1993 and 2000 to a tightening 
of rental markets during the intervening years” (Finkel and 
Buron 2001, p. 1). While the national rate was roughly
70 percent, lease-ups in New York and Los Angeles occurred 
at, again, a reduced rate. In New York, only 57 percent of 
families, and in Los Angeles, only 47 percent, were able to find 
and lease a rental unit. The MTO lease-up rate in Los Angeles 
(averaged over several years), surprisingly, was higher, at
61 percent, for the treatment group, while in New York it was 
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Finkel and Buron (2001) also explore the types of program 
activities that occurred alongside tightening markets. Local 
agencies that required tenant screening and counseling 
typically achieved higher rates of lease-ups compared with 
those that did not (Finkel and Buron 2001, pp. 3-19). It appears 
clear from this evidence that lease-up rates are constrained by 
larger market forces but are also, within some margin, 
malleable. Programmatic tools and interventions appear 
relevant and reasonable for assisting tenant clients to find a 
rental unit in a timely manner. The MTO intervention appears 
less anomalous and boutique-like under tightened market 
circumstances.
An additional part of the answer to whether lower lease-up 
rates are an acceptable cost of administering an MTO-like 
extension will rest on clear research evidence of the effects that 
lower poverty neighborhoods will have on Section 8 families’ 
futures. If it should turn out in the 2000 census that the 
neighborhoods to which many regular Section 8 families 
moved are in deep poverty and distressed, and we become 
reasonably certain that the long-term prospects for these 
families are not good, the option to expand MTO will become 
more attractive. That those tenants may be slightly better off 
than they would be in public housing will mean little, since 
their opportunities for positive change are seriously 
constrained. Thus, there would be little self-sufficiency gained 
from such higher lease-up rates.
If  MTO treatment-group families are shown to still be 
living largely in low-poverty locations that now look notably 
better than those into which regular Section 8 families moved, 
and if positive outcomes continue, there should be less 
opposition to allowing local jurisdictions to offer an MTO-like 
counseling effort—with some restrictions on vouchers to move 
into low-poverty areas. Should treatment-group families look 
much better off than in-place public-housing families, the 
arguments in favor of an MTO-like expansion could appear 
even more appealing.
Researchers will also need to debate which of several 
possible administrative agencies are best suited to deliver 
MTO-like Section 8 assistance. Some will argue that the 1930s-
era PHAs are outmoded and ineffective mechanisms for 
responding to interwoven housing and employment needs on 
a regional basis. Housing programs, such as Section 8, need not 
be managed by funding the traditional 3,000 or more PHAs. 
Set-asides of funding could be awarded competitively to those 
communities that can create effective sets of administrative 
tools that will permit cost-effective options for regionwide 
housing mobility as part of their programming.
Better delivery of programs, for example, might be 
accomplished by linking real estate brokerage services to 
nonprofit counseling agencies. PHAs might offer income 
verification and housing inspections if they do so consistently, 
efficiently, and promptly. Some local PHAs have already 
recognized the advantages of linking information and services 
across their wider region, using their annual and five-year plans 
to assess how to best offer a regionwide, diverse range of 
neighborhood choices to their clients (Tegler, Hanley, and 
Liben 1995). State and local PHAs, as well as other program 
providers, could be offered incentives to make affordable 
regional housing markets materialize and function at a 
controlled scale so that the PHAs, local landlords, and 
neighborhood associations all become comfortable with their 
role in managing a “fair” share of the city’s poor, assisted 
families (Katz and Turner 2001). Such policy transitions may 
take a decade or more in communities resistant to the poor and 
public housing, but they may move more quickly if private 
organizations, nonprofit groups, and PHAs throughout the 
region combine their skills and resources.
There need not, then, be one-size-fits-all programming. 
Funds could be allocated for a three-to-ten-year period with 
periodic verification required of how well families were 
provided options for housing mobility out of ghetto projects. 
Hope VI redevelopment options could be included as part of 
the mix of choice offered to families, so that options did not 
remain narrowly limited. Housing policies must be capable of 
managing multiple program options to meet the needs of local 
families, since in the past fifty years, one-size-fits-all markets 
have often proved ruinously inflexible and inept (Haveman 
1994, p. 444; Downs 1994, p. 99).
MTO evidence to date suggests that only when a range of 
choices is available to the inner-city poor can agencies begin to 
effectively undo the damage to those living in concentrated 
poverty. Subsequently, when careful observation and data 
collection tell us who chose what action, why, and with what 
result, we will be more confident that going to scale is a 
necessary and even cost-effective program option. How might 
MTO be extended to other cities or expanded to a somewhat 
larger scale? A few preliminary policy suggestions to support 
the decision to increase the size and scale of an MTO-like set of 
program requirements and restrictions follow.
Do It Slowly and with Greater Public Involvement
Among the lessons from neighborhood opposition to MTO in 
one Baltimore suburb in 1994 (Ihlanfeldt 1999) is the sense that 
with better notice to the affected communities, and at a slower 
pace, opposition might have been lessened if not altogether 
mollified. The hurry to implement the demonstration meant 
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a racial and class integration program was not taken by either 
HUD or the local administering agencies. The explicit and up-
front exclusion of areas that did not have 10 percent or less 
poverty should have been announced and publicized more 
clearly, because a nontrivial number of protestors came from 
areas that were not eligible sites for MTO family relocation.
Explain It Better
The imbroglio in Baltimore County in the first months of 
MTO’s existence suggests that HUD and local PHAs could do 
a better job of explaining the potential links between any large-
scale public-housing demolition programs, such as Hope VI, 
and MTO housing mobility. Housing mobility options should 
not become the political patsy for badly administered tenant-
relocation programs tied to Hope VI. This may well mean that 
MTO-like options cannot be implemented concurrently with 
inner-city demolition programs, or not until the public 
throughout the region understands and accepts the role that 
screening and counseling will play in allocating families to their 
communities. Addressing the complex intersection of race 
and class will have to be undertaken by multiple levels of 
government, and on a sustained basis, with MTO-like evidence 
offering relevant input.
MTO Does Not Appear Appropriate for All, 
but Can Assist Additional Families
MTO appears not to be suited for everyone. It has attracted 
certain types of families with specific characteristics and levels 
of motivation. Motivation helps set movers apart from those 
who failed to move and appears to be a key to MTO’s future 
(Popkin and Cunningham 2000). Those who volunteered 
for MTO and then found a private-market apartment are 
somewhat different from other poor public-housing residents 
still living in deeply poor neighborhoods. Additional research 
may help us appreciate the full extent to which MTO families 
differ from others. This is true for the movers, whose moti-
vations and opportunities enabled them to move to a new 
neighborhood either as part of the experimental or Section 8 
control group. To whom do the positive outcomes found in the 
research reported in this paper best apply? To what universe of 
public-housing families do they generalize?
Although MTO does not appear to be a relevant option for 
all public-housing residents, the fact that thousands of families 
volunteered for MTO in five cities suggests that they are not 
alone in their fear of crime and desire to move out of the 
projects. MTO could be expanded into a program of modest 
size, offered in a wider range of metropolitan areas and over 
multiple years, to ensure that the operation of regional 
counseling and restricted vouchers remains effective.
It is also possible, as MTO’s results become more widely 
established and accepted, that the differences between 
“volunteers” for any future program and those remaining 
behind may narrow. Agencies may learn to explain and 
motivate families better in the sending as well as the receiving 
communities. This is of course a fundamental, treacherous 
assumption at the heart of “normalizing” MTO. It is also 
subject to at least two qualifications:
• Crime rates and interest in MTO: Given the critical 
importance of fear of crime as a root source for families’ 
interest in MTO, will the apparent decline in urban 
crime rates since the mid-1990s mean that fewer families 
will be impelled to seek to get out through an MTO-like 
program (Blumstein 2000; Fountain 2001)? Or will 
crime rates return to higher levels and sustain interest in 
the option to move out?
• Hope VI and enrollments: To what extent will inner-city 
revitalization programs, such as Hope VI, result in more 
families wanting to return to their old neighborhoods in 
newly refurbished housing units? Will the presence of 
more viable inner-city choices reduce interest in housing 
options that send families far from their old neighbors?
It May Not Be Relevant for Every City
There is suggestive evidence in MTO site-based research that 
MTO has worked slightly differently in various regions. For 
example, an MTO option may appear to be of far greater 
benefit to families in Baltimore than in Boston. Site differences 
may prove of interest and importance in subsequent program 
implementation.
Whether MTO is relevant for a specific metropolitan area 
may depend on whether the rental housing market includes 
enough landlords willing to rent to low-income, former public-
housing families. In looser markets, more landlords appear 
available and willing to wait while the local PHA completes 
paperwork and inspections. In tighter markets, it is clear that 
Section 8 in general, and more likely MTO, will find it difficult 
to achieve reasonable rates of lease-up. Analysis of the causes of 
variation in demonstration effects between sites may help in 
appreciating the scale and reasons for cross-site variation.132 The Impacts of New Neighborhoods on Poor Families
Counseling Appears to Help
Although it is not statistically certain whether the restricted 
vouchers or counseling had a greater effect in achieving the 
effects shown to date, housing counseling (Shroder 2002; 
Finkel and Buron 2001) has benefits in promoting lease-ups in 
low-poverty areas. Unlike many PHAs, such as New York’s, 
which provide “almost no assistance to tenants in the housing 
search” (Kamber 2000, pp. 6, 30), an extended MTO option 
would require that poor families receive help in searching 
widely enough to make dispersed housing choices possible and 
meaningful to the family.
Restrictions and the Meaning of Opportunity
There are both pros and cons associated with restricting the use 
of Section 8 rental assistance to low-poverty communities. 
Galster’s (2002) comments offer reason for policymakers to 
examine the precise percentages of poverty and affluence that 
might best facilitate the least harmful process for selecting 
receiving neighborhoods to ensure that there will never be too 
many Section 8 families allocated into any one vulnerable area.
It is also important to ensure that 10 percent poor does not 
remain the sole definition of an area of opportunity. Future 
expansion of MTO could include labor market and school 
characteristics as among the variables that can assist in selecting 
a set of neighborhoods for MTO-like counseling.
Balancing limits or temporary quotas with the principle that 
Section 8 families should have the freedom to choose whatever 
neighborhood they would like will require a new generation of 
policy thinking within both HUD and Congress, especially as 
long as the Section 8 program continues to serve as “the only 
(housing) game in town” (Quigley 2000).
Make Timely Use of the Analysis of Costs and Benefits
When future research provides a clearer understanding of the 
total costs and the social and economic benefits of MTO, 
policymakers will likely find it easier to justify the cost of 
funding for additional housing mobility vouchers and 
counseling. Until that time, improvements in reading scores 
and reductions in childhood asthma appear to offer adequate 
justification for allowing PHAs to offer such a choice without 
waiting. If, in a clinical medical experiment, patients were 
found to benefit from a trial medication in the way that MTO 
has allowed, there would likely be justification for permitting 
other lives to be aided. There remain ample reasons for caution, 
but the chance that some children’s lives can be substantially 
improved by the choice of a different neighborhood suggests 
that additional families should be offered this choice and 
allowed to decide for themselves.
7. Concluding Observations
Based upon the research reported in this paper, it is possible to 
draw one clear policy conclusion and one provisional, although 
important, research conclusion. First, MTO’s operations 
demonstrate that it is possible for HUD and local PHAs to 
operate successfully an economic and racial desegregation 
program using Section 8 rental assistance in differing 
metropolitan markets. It has shown that, on a small scale, you 
can reverse the historical practice of concentrating poor 
minority households in poor minority neighborhoods, limiting 
their housing choices, and exacerbating problems of economic 
and racial isolation. It is, however, important to note, as the 
research by Feins (forthcoming) points out, that the low-
poverty neighborhoods into which experimental-group 
families moved were often heavily minority. MTO was 
successful in providing a “mixed-income” neighborhood 
rather than offering communities that are predominantly 
white. MTO families who moved live in less racially segregated 
communities than in-place control-group families but, then, 
the latter live in neighborhoods that are among the most 
racially and economically segregated in the United States.
Second, preliminary research on MTO’s effects on families 
demonstrates that beneficial, statistically significant changes 
have occurred in families’ lives within two to four years of their 
participation in MTO. The first phase of MTO research reveals 
that households in the treatment group, as well as some Section 8 
comparison-group families, have experienced improvements 
in multiple measures of well-being relative to the in-place 
control group. This has included better health for adults and 
fewer behavior problems among boys. Treatment-group family 
members experienced declines in depression and asthma 
following their moves from public housing, and male children 
were much less likely to pose disciplinary problems.
In the area of education, despite the potential difficulties of 
making the transition out of poor neighborhoods and their 
schools, there is evidence of improvements in one MTO site. 
Treatment-group children ages five through twelve have 
experienced substantial gains in academic achievement as 
measured by standardized test scores, compared with children 
in the control group. If these results are borne out in 
subsequent research, the demonstration will have achieved 
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than anticipated. The unclear effects for older children compel 
further research as part of the cross-site MTO evaluations. 
Qualitative research conducted in 2001suggests that a number 
of parents in that sample did not move their children to new 
schools, but kept them in the schools serving their original 
high-poverty neighborhoods (Popkin, Harris, and 
Cunningham 2002). The extent to which families have made 
moves into low-poverty communities but not taken advantage 
of “local” resources and institutions represents a crucial 
question for the next stage in MTO research.
MTO not only provides a clearer understanding of how 
residential mobility programs can operate, but has clarified the 
temporally sequenced, quantifiable effects that this change in 
neighborhood has on the lives of parents and children who 
would likely otherwise remain in “ghetto” neighborhoods. 
These changes appear to have occurred in some areas of social 
and economic life more clearly than in others; and in some 
cities, more surely than in others.
Achieving improvements in education performance, 
reductions in criminal behavior, improvements in adults’ 
mental and physical health, as well as a reduction in welfare 
dependence, is a nontrivial initial policy and research 
contribution. MTO’s ability to document the conditions under 
which large numbers of poor families’ lives may be improved as 
a result of a change in their neighborhood is potentially among 
the most significant social science and policy legacies that HUD 
will have for the next decade or more.
There are, nonetheless, a critical number of important 
research and policy issues that need to be addressed by future 
research aimed at clearer appreciation of the consequences of 
life in high-poverty public-housing developments compared 
with life in less concentrated Section 8 comparison- and 
treatment-group neighborhoods. Such research should also 
help establish the conditions under which a programmatic 
extension of the MTO program might best be developed. 
Knowing in which communities and neighborhoods, and for 
which types of families, such a program may work best will 
greatly aid in offering alternatives to life within high-rise, high-
poverty communities. If Downs (1999, p. 967) is correct in 
observing that most efforts to revitalize deeply poor 
communities through community development have “almost 
universally failed,” then some form of regional housing 
mobility effort such as MTO is a necessary accompaniment to 
other development strategies (Katz and Turner 2001).
Some neighborhoods, families, and policy analysts will 
continue to oppose agencies such as HUD and its Section 8 
program to protect what they feel is theirs from perceived or 
actual threats (Husock 2000). Such opposition can, however, 
be better managed to reduce its occurrence or effects. The 
worst consequence of acquiescing fully to such opposition 
would be to leave in place public housing as a “federally 
funded, physically permanent institution for the isolation of 
black families by race and class” (Massey and Kanaiaupuni 
1993, p. 120). Heclo (1994, p. 427) sagely reminds us of 
additional obstacles to expanding MTO: “Full-scale attacks on 
ghetto poverty will inevitably mean targeting resources 
disproportionately on minorities. Whether such efforts are 
seen as pro-black preferences or an act of solidarity with the 
country’s children and its future will depend heavily on how 
political leaders help educate the public.” Few political leaders 
of either party have done, or have been able to do, much to 
address this concern. MTO offers policymakers, for the first 
time, necessary if not yet sufficient evidence that children’s 
lives have been notably benefited and that parts of the “ghetto” 
poverty problem can be redressed. Endnotes
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1. For additional details, see Goering, Feins, and Richardson (2002).
2. Regarding the latter, he notes: “Determining the cost-benefit 
relationship is easier said than done. Although the costs are usually 
easy enough to measure, determining the monetary value of the 
benefits is often difficult” (Crane 1998, p.  3). See also Brooks-Gunn, 
Berlin, Leventhal, and Fuligni (2000).
3. A National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing 
had, in 1989, recommended a strategy for the elimination of the worst 
projects in forty of the country’s largest cities. The program derived 
from this recommendation, Hope VI, was enacted at the same time as 
MTO. Congress allocated $1.6 billion for this program from 1993 to 
1995 (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1996).References
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